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In this article, I a rgue that t he s tar t ing point for inquiry about practice knowledge 
should be the empir ical quest ion, How does the competent practitioner go about 
knowing "in" practice? Using the work of J u r g e n Habermas, Michael Polyani, Donald 
Schon, and others , I advance a claim for the nonderivative status of substantive 
rationality a longside the technical in the construct ion of professional knowledge. I 
maintain that the researcher and practitioner have functionally different relationships 
to the practice arena and, therefore, differing cognitive interests for their involvement 
in that arena. These interests are assumed decisive for (1) categories in which knowledge 
is s t ructured, (2) me thods by which t ru th claims are authenticated, (3) the type of 
discourse in which knowledge is communicated, and (4) the mode in which knowledge 
is available to t he knower. 
The professional school of social work builds its raison d'etre on the 
notion that theoretical knowledge can be translated into skills and 
know-how for practice. In the prevailing view, knowledge generated 
and disseminated in the academy is applied to problems faced in 
the practice a rena . 1 T h e language of technology (applied research) 
is the metaphor of choice for the relationship assumed to exist 
between the achievements of the academic, on the one hand, and the 
work of the practitioner, on the other. From the perspective of this 
metaphor, the role of the researcher-theoretician is to produce and 
authenticate knowledge, whereas the role of the practitioner is to apply 
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knowledge. Thus, practical knowledge becomes derivative. It is the 
technical or scientific application of formal knowledge. By and large, 
this construction of the theory-practice relationship is endorsed as 
normative, although it is usually conceded that the formulation is an 
ideal toward which the profession aspires, rather than an empirical 
accomplishment. 
T h e existence of a certain amount of discontinuity between theory 
a n d research, on the one hand, and practice, on the other, has long 
been a preoccupation in the literature. 2 Historically, efforts to deal 
with the theory-to-practice tension have taken a number of directions. 
T h e several debates may be grouped roughly but, for our purposes, 
conveniently into three categories. (1) Initially, the literature identified 
a n d debated a need for more accountable, hence, more "scientific," 
approaches to practice. This literature included exhortations for the 
social work professional to become more diligent in making connections 
between theory and practice and to become increasingly systematic in 
evaluating practice outcomes. 3 (2) Following the initial calls for more 
scientific-based practice, commentators began proposing concrete sug-
gestions for generating research and building theory within practice 
settings. Among other topics, this group of articles advanced a case 
for the single-subject design as the research model most suitable for 
use by the practitioner. 4 (3) More recently, the debate was enjoined 
over dominant philosophical paradigms in social work knowledge and 
research. This literature deliberated the merits of positivism as the 
paradigmatic ideal for the conduct of social science. 5 
Despite their differences, partisans to each side of the various debates 
regarding professional knowledge share a common ground. They are 
concerned about the task of establishing knowledge that is valid and 
reliable with reference to the practice world and "user friendly" for 
the practitioner. Although on the surface this formulation of the task 
appears to be an unexceptionable one, it is, in fact, partial and one-
sided in the assumptions made about practice knowledge. In the effort 
to more successfully wed research and theory to practice, authors in 
social work and social work education have discussed knowledge and 
inquiry "for" and "about" and even "in" practice. What has been missing 
from our collective conversation concerning practice knowledge is an 
empirical study of practice knowledge itself.6 What does the competent 
practitioner know, and how does he or she know it? What does the 
practitioner think, and how does he or she go about constructing 
thought? What are the processes by which practice decisions are made? 
T h e s e and similar questions have received limited attention in the 
l i terature, but they are crucial to furthering our dialogue on the re-
lationship between theory and action. 7 
Instead of beginning this inquiry about practice knowledge with 
definitions of knowledge "for" practice, I argue that the starting point 
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should be the empirical question, How does the competent practitioner 
go about knowing "in" practice? 8 Such a perspective would reverse 
the usual order of business, which gives preeminent place to formal-
technical knowledge and which assigns derivative status to the "practical" 
as a way of knowing. Rather than regarding the practical reasoning 
of the practitioner as simply a derivative of the formal knowledge 
advanced in the academy, my approach advances the epistemological 
status of "practical knowledge" as a distinct and identifiable mode of 
knowing in its own right. 9 When this status is granted, the practical 
takes its place alongside the formal-technical as constitutive elements 
of professional knowledge. 
Using primarily the work of critical theorist Jiirgen Habermas on 
the manner in which differing domains of human interest create distinct 
forms of knowledge, 1 0 I develop a conceptual model for examining 
differences between formal (technical) and practical (substantive) 
knowledge. 1 1 The model advanced here is based on the epistemological 
premise that the differing functional interests of the technical and 
practical arenas of human activity mandate distinctly different forms 
of knowledge. Using the model, I go on to examine how these interests 
serve to organize knowledge with regard to the primary cognitive 
commitments involved, the categories and processes in which rationality 
is structured, the methods by which truth claims are authenticated, 
the type of discourse in which knowledge is typically communicated 
and extended, and, finally, the manner in which knowledge is most 
readily available to the knower. I use the work of Michael Polyani on 
tacit knowing, the contributions of Donald Schon regarding professional 
practice knowledge, and others, to further elaborate the model. 1 2 
Philosophical Bases for Reclaiming the Practical 
The suggestion that practical knowledge and formal-technical knowledge 
are distinctly different forms of knowing is by no means a novel idea. 
In Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle distinguished among technical, practical, 
and theoretical forms of reasoning. 1 3 Technical (instrumental or means-
ends) rationality (techne) presupposes given ends, follows known rules, 
and uses given means to achieve those ends. It is both action and 
product. Making, manufacturing, mastering, and producing are action 
words associated with the technical, which is also the world of Hannah 
Arendt's homo faber.14 
Practical reasoning, by contrast, does not assume known ends or 
given means. On the contrary, the ends may be ambiguous, and available 
means may be questionable or inadequate. Praxis is the form of reasoning 
appropriate to social, political, or other interactive contexts in which 
the individual, drawing on experience to provide a grasp of the im-
mediate situation, reasons how to act prudently and correctly in a 
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given set of circumstances. Prudence supersedes effectiveness as the 
relevant virtue in such cases. Indeed, the prudent person may be called 
on to make choices among several potentially effective (or equally 
ineffective) courses of action. 
According to Aristotle, a third category of knowledge, theoretical 
reasoning, involves the pursuit of purely intellectual questions. Dis-
ciplines such as analytic philosophy or the so-called pure sciences 
require theoretical reasoning. Since social work research is not a pure 
science, this category of knowing is irrelevant to the present discussion. 
From another intellectual tradition, sociologist and philosopher Ha-
bermas has developed a theory of science that makes explicit distinctions 
between technical and practical knowledge. His categories are defined 
in a manner overlapping those of Aristotle. 1 5 The particular contribution 
of Habermas is the link he draws between distinct domains of human 
activity and the type of knowledge constituted by those domains. In 
other words, Habermas demonstrates a way to connect forms of knowing 
with modes of being and acting in the world. 1 6 
In Habermas's view, there are two initial ways in which human 
beings act on their world. 1 7 Through production or instrumental action, 
individuals and collectivities attempt to shape the material and social 
world to satisfy their physical needs and desires. Through interaction 
or symbolic activity, individuals and communities strive to give meaning 
and coherence to their social existence. 1 8 According to Habermasian 
epistemology, these domains of human activity are "knowledge con-
stitutive." 1 9 That is to say, differences in the functional and cognitive 
interests of the actors in these two domains mandate fundamentally 
different modes of rationality. 2 0 Corresponding to the instrumental 
domain is technical knowledge; corresponding to the interactive domain 
is practical knowledge. 
When Habermas speaks of knowledge being constituted by the prag-
matic interests and commitments of the actors in a specific domain of 
activity, what he means is that these interests structure the manner in 
which knowledge is organized and inquiry advanced. Which questions 
will be asked? Which data will emerge as "fact," and how is that fact 
to be defined? By what standards will knowledge be judged, and which 
reference groups will arbitrate such standards? For Habermas, these 
and similar questions cannot be answered in the abstract, but only 
with reference to the particular arena of human life and activity in 
which they are asked. 
Habermas's principal objective of Knowledge and Human Interests is 
to promote the claims of the interpretive and the critical sciences over 
and against the empirical-analytical sciences as disciplines appropriate 
to the study of human social life. Thus, he is more concerned with 
establishing the interpretive sciences as a means for studying the in-
teractive or practical domain than he is with elaborating practical 
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rationality as a way of knowing in its own right. Nevertheless, his 
arguments provide a rationale and lay the groundwork for positing a 
form of knowledge and method of inquiry proper to the interactive 
sphere of human existence. 
Technical and Substantive Rationality and Discourse 
Let us consider this unexceptionable claim: the study of practice is 
not practice. From the perspective of the researcher-technician, social 
work practice is a phenomenon to be investigated; for the practitioner, 
it is lived experience. The difference is not simply a matter of quantity 
or quality of information available to the researcher or to the practitioner. 
It is not, for example, that the practitioner has an inside track to 
knowledge the outsider does not, or cannot, possess. Nor is it that the 
researcher has access to more reliable information. The critical issue 
is that the researcher and practitioner, respectively, have functionally 
different relationships to the practice arena and, therefore, differing 
cognitive interests for their involvement in that arena. 2 1 These differing 
interests, in turn, result in characteristically different forms of rationality 
and discourse. 
Broadly speaking, the instrumental, or technical, domain of activity 
refers to ways in which h u m a n beings seek to make the world they 
inhabit responsive to their needs and desires. In order to create the 
conditions in which needs are met and desires fulfilled, the criterion 
of effective control becomes the regulating principle. The accomplish-
ment of given ends depends on correctly assessing the various means 
available to achieve those ends. Decision rules for action are based on 
some calculus of probability in reaching the stated goal. This mode 
of rationality is defined in terms of means-end or technical reasoning. 2 2 
If instrumental action requires analyzing the means relative to the 
ends for the purpose of control or management, it must also require 
some estimation of potential outcomes. Tha t is to say, it requires the 
ability to make empirically verifiable predictions about events and 
behavior. Prediction can occur only when abstraction from the concrete 
situation is sufficient to permit generalization about regularities across 
other instances. Prediction, in turn, necessitates the structuring of 
situations into causes and effects. In order to predict, one needs to 
know that, if a particular state of affairs changes or is altered, another 
state of affairs will likewise be altered. At the same time, the imperatives 
of accuracy in predicting events dictate procedural standards that dif-
ferentiate (or at least attempt to differentiate) between observed facts 
and the knowing subject's experience of those facts. 2 3 The applied 
sciences offer the quintessential example of instrumental activity, with 
its accompanying mode of rationality. 
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By contrast with the formal-technical mode of reasoning appropriate 
to the instrumental sphere of human activity, the interactive, or practical, 
domain is characterized by a substantive rationality. Whereas the 
achievements of the instrumental domain are premised on an ability 
to successfully predict and organize outcomes and to operate at a level 
of abstraction that allows generalization from one singular event to 
other similar events, the interactive sphere has as its prime directive 
the need to understand the immediate meaning and implication of 
context. This understanding is necessary for the kind of deliberation 
in which decision rules are discovered within the evolving context 
itself, instead of being formulated a priori. Various expectations, com-
mitments, and understandings converge on the decision moment, along 
with the constraints of resource, resolve, and perception. 
If the applied sciences epitomize the achievements of technical rea-
soning, professional practice in the human and social services exemplifies 
the accomplishments of practical rationality. The social work practitioner 
attempting to decide in a specific, concrete case how to reconcile issues 
of client confidentiality with mandates to report dangerousness engages 
in practical reasoning, as does the politician (in Aristotle's sense) who 
must make a decision on behalf of the community, given multiple 
constituencies and multiple issues. Such decisions are seldom derived 
through an algorithmic application of general rules to the specific 
instance. Indeed, the case may be made that simple, linear applications 
of theory to the concrete case are more frequently the mark not of 
the expert but of the novice professional, one who is either unaware 
of the complexities or unable to systematically take them into account. 2 4 
If the linear equation provides a convenient metaphor for technical 
rationality, the most appropriate metaphor for substantive rationality 
is the hologram. Substantive rationality involves an emerging recognition 
or discovery of the multidimensional structure, shape, and significance 
of a problem. Jerome Bruner suggests that "we solve a problem or 
make a discovery when we impose a puzzle form on a difficulty and 
convert it into a problem that can be solved in such a way that it gets 
us where we want to go . " 2 5 Problem solving in complex, interactional 
situations occurs when what Bruner terms "puzzle forms," or com-
binations of such forms, are tried out for goodness of fit with the 
structure of a concrete problem. Substantive rationality may be described 
as the dialectical process in which the emerging recognition of the 
structure of a problem and the imposition of "puzzle forms" interact 
in some combination that, if successful, results in tentative solutions. 
In the unproblematic case and for the experienced professional, an 
appreciation for goodness of fit generally occurs at a tacit level of 
awareness. 2 6 
In the perspective adopted here, the substantive knowledge employed 
in practice may be understood in part as a specialized, systematized, 
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and sanctioned form of praxis, ordinary interactional know-how. Thus, 
Martin Rein and Sheldon White maintain: "Praxis is what everybody 
knows how to do and does in a society. Practice consists of a system 
of actions unique to and institutionally vested in a professional role; 
it occurs when social behavior is drawn from the general behavior of 
the society and segregated into a professional preserve." 2 7 This view 
of practical knowledge identifies the real world connection between 
professional practice and "naive" praxis at the same time that it defines 
differences between the two. Similarly, just as practice is an extension 
of praxis, scientific knowledge is an extension of techne, the commonsense 
knowledge human beings bring to bear in making their environment 
work for them. 2 8 Like the practitioner, the technician or scientist brings 
all her or his native, technical know-how and common sense to focus 
on the scientific project. She or he does not leave this ordinary human 
"equipment" at the door of the laboratory. 
Thus, it is not, as some int imate, 2 9 that practice (and practical ra-
tionality) retains connectedness with ordinary life experiences, whereas 
science (and technical rationality) does not. The roots of both science 
and practice are to be found in the everyday processes and achievements 
of human beings who seek to manage {techne) their world and to orient 
their action (praxis) in relation to others in that world. 
Methodology: Objective or Contextual 
Thomas Nagel suggests that some of the most central problems of 
human knowledge derive from the following question: "how to combine 
the perspective of a particular person inside the world with an objective 
view of that same world, the person and his viewpoint included." 3 0 
The critical issue is the relationship of the knowing subject to that 
which is known. The natures of the technical project {techne) and of 
the practical project (praxis) dictate different resolutions to this problem. 
Lest the reader understandably, but erroneously, anticipate that I will 
try to correlate the technical-practical dichotomy with the objective-
subjective distinction, let me be clear that I will propose an alternate 
view. 
With Nagel, I define subjectivity and objectivity as methods of un-
derstanding and securing knowledge and only secondarily as the prod-
ucts of that understanding. With Nagel, too, I view the distinction 
between the subjective and the objective as a matter of degree. 3 1 A 
method of understanding is defined as subjective if it relies largely on 
the perspective of the singular knower. A method for securing knowledge 
may be characterized as more objective than another the less it depends 
"on the specifics of the individual's makeup and position in the world 
or on the character of the particular type of creature he is ." 3 2 Whereas 
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the essence of the objective lies in replicability, the subjective is defined 
in terms of its singularity. 
Earlier I suggested that the functional and pragmatic commitments 
of technical knowledge dictate a methodology that brackets the sub-
jectivity of the knower from that which is known. That is to say, t h e 
methodological stance of the technical is an objective one. This objective 
approach is the basis of all scientific inquiry (qualitative as well a s 
quantitative).33 Its methods are, in the first place, an effort to guarantee 
the integrity of what is known as distinct from the perspective of t h e 
one who knows. Without this kind of objectivity, there would be n o 
basis for accepting the conclusions of the knower apart from the strength 
of his or her word. More pragmatically, there would be no basis f o r 
assuming that the causal claims of the investigator are related to actual 
patterns of occurrence, patterns which, in turn, support generalization 
and prediction. 
Yet, as we know, there are limits to scientific objectivity. As Nagel 
maintains, the goal to give an account of the world from a perspective 
that transcends particular points of view is realizable only by approx-
imation because "we ourselves are the first obstacles to such an a m -
bition." 3 4 Scientific objectivity is sought not by denying the subjectivity 
of the researcher-technician, which in any event cannot be denied. 
Instead, it is secured by adopting an objective attitude in which o n e 
acknowledges the limitation of singular standpoints by applying rigorous, 
procedural safeguards. Controls for ensuring the reliability and validity 
of investigation contribute to this kind of objectivity, as does the fun -
damental, critical stance that submits even one's most cherished h y -
potheses to empirical validation. 3 5 
It is common to find references in the literature suggesting t ha t , 
whereas scientific (technical) knowledge is objective in nature, practice 
knowledge is, and cannot help but be, subjective. 3 6 This suggestion 
betrays a naivete about the complexity of knowing in practice. T h e 
suggestion becomes even more problematic once we recognize t h a t 
the word "subjective," like the word "objective," has several definitions 
that are not always clear, even in context. Although by no means a n 
exhaustive list, the following meanings may be implied when the t e r m 
"subjective" is used to describe practice knowledge: (1) a view f r o m 
the perspective of a knowing subject (the "I"); (2) an unwarranted o r 
even premeditated contamination of that which is known by the partisan 
interests of the knowing subject (biasing, prejudicing); and (3) a n 
assumption that the world of the knowing subject is the true and o n l y 
reality (solipsism, narcissism, as in the phrase "hopelessly subjective"). 
Subjectivity, in the latter two meanings of the term, is as unacceptable 
in practice as it is in research. Like the researcher, the pract i t ioner 
employs a variety of procedures to establish and maintain objectivity 
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over subjectivity in the negative sense of the term. Role definitions, 
reciprocal expectations, measures of accountability, and standards for 
professional conduct are among the means employed to protect the 
achievements of practice knowledge from particularist claims. However, 
if the term subjectivity refers simply to the perspective of the knowing 
subject, the issue becomes more complicated. Is practical knowledge 
subjective in this latter meaning of the term? The answer is probably 
as much "yes" as it is "no." 
In Habermasian terms, practical reason is the form of rationality 
proper to the interactive arena of human life. In this arena, knower 
and known are involved in the same social, cultural, and symbolic 
experiences and are, thus, accomplices in the activity of creating and 
understanding meanings. As Charles Horton Cooley long ago suggested: 
"We learn to know human life outwardly and inwardly and at the same 
time and by a single process." 3 7 In the world of praxis, the personal 
perspective of the knower must be gleaned for all the understanding 
it yields about a meaning-world he or she knows intimately. By contrast 
with technical knowledge, which requires that the subjective self of 
the knower be systematically set aside, practical knowing is pursued, 
in part, through the subjective involvement of the one who knows and 
acts. The personal standpoint of the individual engaged in praxis 
yields a knowledge critical to effective, practical action. 
However, knowledge from the subjective standpoint of the knower 
is itself insufficient for effective practice. Detachment from that point 
of view is equally critical. Any interactive situation supplies multiple, 
possibly valid, perspectives. These perspectives are available only to 
the individual who is able (and willing) to relinquish the personal 
standpoint. There is a form of objectivity, as Nagel suggests, that 
"allows us to transcend our particular viewpoint and develop an ex-
panded consciousness that takes the world in more fully." 3 8 In this 
form of objectivity, the central conceptual task requires the practitioner 
to detach from his or her partial and personal perspective and remain 
open to and aware of other perspectives. 3 9 The central ethical task 
requires that the practitioner simultaneously recognize other subjects 
whose understandings limit and objectify one's own . 4 0 T h e ultimate 
task, however, is for the practitioner to accomplish conceptual and 
ethical objectivity while retaining commitments to his or her own 
viewpoint as valid and applicable. 
Practitioners who engage in clinical intervention with families, for 
example, frequently speak of "joining with" the family. At one level, 
"joining with" implies that the worker develop a subjective understanding 
of what it is like to be part of a particular family system. T h e activity 
of joining with, however, is incomplete without "standing apart." T h e 
clinician must become both insider and outsider to the knowledge the 
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family has of itself. In this as in other situations, the clinical practitioner 
must rely on subjective knowledge as well as on sources of understanding 
that transcend and condition the personal perspective. 
Thus, it is only partially true to say that practice knowledge is sub-
jective. In order to take effective action, the practitioner must be able 
to move from the subjective perspective to an objective view of that 
perspective, and back again. This implies that the practitioner must 
be able to view even his or her own perspectives "from the outside, 
as events in the world." 4 1 The epistemological stance in practice is 
contextual; both the subjectivity of the practitioner-knower and the 
objective imperatives of the context must be figured into the sum of 
what is known. 
Explicit or Tacit Knowledge 
Ever since Descartes, a separation between thinking and doing has 
been etched into the Western intellectual tradition. Descartes's dictum 
made cognition ontologically and logically prior to being and acting. 
Debates in the literature between research and theory, on the one 
hand, and practice, on the other, are a legacy of this tradition in which 
action is assumed to follow thought. This understanding of the rela-
tionship between thinking and acting is generally presumed in the 
social work literature with few exceptions. 4 2 Within certain other dis-
ciplines, however, this view has been sharply challenged. 4 3 One of the 
more central works in this challenge has been Polyani's exposition of 
the personal and tacit dimension of human knowing. 4 4 
Polyani's distinction between two kinds of awareness, focal awareness 
and subsidiary awareness, is important for the discussion here. According 
to Polyani, in any activity, we are focally aware of whatever is the 
object of our activity; we have a subsidiary awareness of that which 
serves as "instrument." For example, in using a hammer to drive a 
nail, "We watch the effect of our strokes on the nail and try to wield 
the hammer so as to hit the nail most effectively. When we bring down 
the hammer we do not feel that its handle has struck our palm but 
that its head has struck the nail. . . . I have a subsidiary awareness of the 
feeling in the palm of my hand which is merged into my focal awareness 
of my driving in the nail ." 4 5 "Tool," of course, is not limited to artifact; 
a concept, a theory, a skill may form part of our subsidiary awareness 
in performing an activity. What Polyani suggests about the knowledge 
implicit in skills, he also applies to the knowledge embodied in the 
judgments of the experienced professional—the deliberations of the 
judge, the diagnostic acumen of the physician. 4 6 
Polyani's arguments about the tacit dimension of professional 
knowledge are supported by expert systems research. Expert systems 
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are computer programs that attempt to replicate "how an expert knows 
what he knows." 4 7 In order to design these programs, investigators 
mus t first study how experts in a circumscribed area of knowledge 
solve problems. It appears that an important part of how an expert 
knows is known unconsciously. James F. Brule and Alexander Blount, 
for example, maintain that "abstract generalizations about successful 
operation in the domain the expert knows will not be available generally 
to consciousness." 4 8 
When something or some activity is the object of focal awareness, 
it cannot at the same time be the object of subsidiary awareness, and 
vice versa. While attending to the whole, we are only subsidiarily aware 
of any one part or element of the whole. The pianist who concentrates 
on the position of fingers and keys will lose the sonata. 4 9 The social 
worker who focuses attention on the technique of empathic responding 
ra ther than on the state of the client or on the objectives of the interview 
will find that his or her responses seem awkward and staged. In the 
unproblematic case, the knowing-in-action of the practitioner is a unitary 
act in which the theories, constructs, cognition, and skills of the knower 
a re embedded as subsidiary processes, while the focal awareness is 
t uned to the activity as a whole or to the objectives of that activity. 
Whereas substantive knowledge is tacit and embodied in action, 
formal knowledge is explicit, propositional, and discursive. It is outside 
ourselves. We can point to it in texts and other scholarly works. Even 
when there is disagreement within a discipline over the truth claims 
of a particular proposition, it is knowledge that has been sanctioned 
by a community of scholars as legitimate for discourse. By contrast 
with practical knowing, which, when used, is embedded in experience, 
formal knowledge is "out there" as the "adjudicated products of dis-
ciplined inquiry." 5 0 
In describing the typical form in which practical and formal knowledge 
a re available to the knower, two important clarifications are in order. 
First, it would be mistaken to assume that, because formal knowledge 
is explicitly recognized within a discipline as legitimate for scholarly 
debate and inquiry, its truth claim is more valid or more reliable than 
that of the practical. As argued earlier, both are reliable and valid, 
a l though different, forms of knowing. Similarly, both are subject to 
error . Second, it would be inaccurate to conclude from the present 
a rguments that practical knowledge is always or must remain tacit and 
unavailable to our reflective selves. On the contrary, as Schon has 
maintained, particularly in situations of ambiguity or novelty, "our 
thought turns back on the surprising phenomenon, and at the same 
time, back on itself," as a form of "reflection-in-action."51 Such reflection 
is, in fact, one of the ways that practice knowledge becomes refined 
and extended into what the literature rather loosely terms practice 
wisdom. 5 2 
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It is clear, however, that, given the differences between these two 
forms of knowledge, an essentially cognitive interpretation of practice 
knowing will not be effective. We already are aware that the correlation 
between academic achievement and professional performance is not 
always a direct o n e . 5 3 As Michael Connelly and D. Jean Clandinen 
suggest, "If concepts are learned as concepts, they are not necessarily 
submerged, but remain visible and identifiable, and may be recalled 
. . . for achievement tests. . . . But from the perspective of the user, 
precise recall may be a sign of incomplete learning. It is a sign that 
concepts have been learned as concepts . . . and that they are, therefore, 
not 'on calP except in the lesser sense of recall upon demand." 5 4 
Whether learned as ordinary praxis or acquired as specialized practice, 
practical knowing, the skills and reasoning the practitioner applies in 
action, is most readily usable when implicit in the act as "tool." With 
due regard for any reduction involved, it may be said that such knowl-
edge is embodied in the act and the actor. Whatever else this formulation 
suggests, it advances a notion of the relationship between knowing 
and acting that is less linear and more reciprocal than is normally 
assumed in the literature on professional knowledge. 
Some Implications and a Rapprochement 
In an early work, dealing with field learning in the various professions, 
Kenneth D. Benne noted, "Western epistemologists, working for the 
most part, in modern times, in universities, have not drawn their 
models of valid 'knowing' from the methods and products of thinking 
men and women of action who guide, direct, and conceptualize the 
practical 'makings' and 'doings' of culture and society." 5 5 Benne goes 
on to suggest that conflicts the student may experience in attempting 
to bridge the academic and practice arenas are as much a result of 
cognitive differences between these two "worlds" as of attitudinal and 
affective differences. 5 6 
The understanding of what it means to know-in-practice, as developed 
in this article, supports Benne's contention. Basing my major arguments 
on Habermasian critical theory, Polyani's concept of "tacit knowledge," 
and Schon's model of reflective practice, I maintain that the academic 
and practitioner have functionally different relationships to the practice 
arena and, therefore, differing cognitive interests for their involvement 
in that arena. These differing interests are assumed to determine the 
categories in which knowledge is structured, the methods by which 
truth claims are established, the type of discourse in which knowledge 
is typically communicated, and, finally, the form in which knowledge 
is available to the knower. Thus, I advance a claim for the nonderivative 
status of the practical (substantive) alongside the formal in definitions 
of what constitutes professional knowledge. 
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The orientation that defines practice knowledge largely in terms of 
applied technical knowledge has been challenged elsewhere in the 
li terature. 5 7 My position is that such challenges do not go far enough 
in addressing the realities of how practitioners know-in-practice. I 
contend that, as a profession, our underestimation of the extent of 
the discontinuity between the cognitive-functional commitments of 
the technical and of the practical has contributed to our limited success 
in bridging these two arenas of human activity. 
How then are these different, cognitive "worlds" reconciled? Dis-
tinctions that some anthropologists make between "experience-distant" 
and "experience-near" categories of meaning may be pertinent to this 
question. 5 8 In Clifford Geertz's term, "experience-near" categories are 
those that an individual "might himself naturally and effortlessly use 
to define what he or his fellows see, feel, think, imagine, and so on." 5 9 
"Experience-distant" constructs are those that "specialists employ to 
forward their scientific, philosophical. . . aims." 6 0 The terms "constructs" 
and "categories" are intended to include not jus t language per se, but 
all those forms and procedures that communities and individuals use 
to organize inquiry and to structure and communicate knowledge. 
The argument proposed here is a pragmatic one. The reality is that, 
when theory and research move to application, experience-distant 
categories are (and must be capable of being) folded into categories 
that are experience-near. On the surface, this formulation should be 
self-evident. What may be less evident is my central argument. The 
task of translating the "vernacular" of research into the idiographic 
immediacies of practice has seldom been an easy one. The suggestion 
is that this task will become somewhat less arduous when the distinct, 
cognitive status of practical knowledge is clarified and more explicitly 
understood. Ultimately, for the human service practitioner it is the 
functional commitments of the practical that mandate both the categories 
of rationality required in practice and the expression of that rationality 
in action. 
In advocating a perspective that grants legitimacy to substantive 
knowledge alongside the formal in defining professional knowledge, 
I raise a number of questions for social work practice, professional 
education, and social work inquiry. Although a complete elaboration 
of these questions is beyond the scope of the present discussion, it is 
possible to sketch several of the issues that emerge. 
1.1 argue that technical-conceptual knowledge is part, but only part, 
of the total calculus of professional knowledge. Much of the knowledge 
that the professional uses as he or she goes about the business of 
practice is built on his or her own cultural store of "naive" praxis. 6 1 
Even more of what the professional knows has been constructed in 
an ongoing, but often implicit, manner in the course of professional 
practice. 6 2 If this is the case, then critical reflexivity on the part of the 
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professional becomes all the more urgent. As Schon maintains, "Many 
practitioners, locked into a view of themselves as technical experts, 
find nothing in the world of practice to occasion reflection. . . . For 
them, uncertainty is a threat; its admission a sign of weakness. Others 
. . . feel profoundly uneasy because they cannot say what they know 
how to do, cannot justify its quality or rigor." 6 3 
As defined here, critical reflexivity involves the practitioner-knower 
in the process of making explicit the knowledge that is implicit in 
action so that it becomes available for both critique and inquiry. 6 4 The 
effort called for includes, but goes well beyond, the task of outcome 
evaluation. The importance of reflecting on professional activity and 
on the knowing that is embodied in that activity cannot be overstated. 
T h e advancement of professional knowledge (writ large and small) 
requires this ongoing process. 
2. Models for defining the relationship between classroom and field 
reveal underlying assumptions regarding practice knowledge. 6 5 When 
the technical definition of practice knowledge dominates, the field 
practicum experience is viewed primarily as the location in which the 
student "road tests" conceptual knowledge acquired in the classroom. 
When practical (substantive) knowledge is assumed to define professional 
learning, the field experience approximates an apprenticeship. 
With the expanded epistemology proposed here, instructional models 
that reflect more or less exclusively either the technical approach to 
field education or the practical paradigm must be challenged as partial 
and limited. From this viewpoint, both formal (received) knowledge 
and knowledge constructed in practice require emphasis in professional 
education. The practicum becomes the location nonpareil for learning 
how social workers actually go about the business of constructing 
knowledge and of incorporating "received" knowledge as part of that 
construction. An implicit appreciation of this practicum function may 
be part of the reason why social work students and practitioners continue 
to attribute their most significant professional learning, not to the 
classroom, but to the field experience, and why they do so even within 
the dominant shadow of the technical paradigm. 6 6 
3. The social work literature has demonstrated a commitment to 
locating and prescribing new research models for the practitioner. 6 7 
Efforts in the literature to discover methods of inquiry consistent with 
the cognitive commitments of the practicing professional are to be 
applauded. However, it should be stressed that current single-subject 
models are probably not the final word on the issue of appropriate 
paradigms for practice-based research. Schon, for example, argues 
that there is an implicit, but nevertheless systematic, form of investigation 
that the practitioner routinely applies during the course of practice: 
"[the practitioner] reflects on the phenomena before him, and on the 
prior understandings which have been implicit in his behavior. He 
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carries out an experiment which serves to generate both a new un-
derstanding of the phenomena and a change in the situation." 6 8 Schon 
argues that the interests of knowledge generation would be well served 
were researchers to under take a study of how practitioners do, in fact, 
perform inquiry-in-action. 6 9 
One concluding point is in order. I have addressed discontinuities 
between the world of the practitioner and that of the academic from 
an epistemological perspective. This approach is consistent with that 
of a number of other authors who have discussed the differences 
involved as epistemological or paradigmatic in na tu re . 7 0 However, 
there is a political-ideological dimension to the issues involved as well, 
a dimension that one ignores at risk. 7 1 
From the perspective of techne, social work is not only a phenomenon 
to be investigated, it is a phenomenon to be improved. Thus , the 
practice arena supplies both the "raw" material for study and the 
market for knowledge and ideas. The practitioner becomes consumer, 
and human technology becomes product or commodity. It is at this 
point that the functional commitments of the technical domain are in 
danger of becoming not simply pragmatic interests, but ideological 
investments. When the practice world is viewed primarily as a derivative 
of the technical, servicing its research needs and providing a market 
for its products, the metaphor evoked is one of colonization. For those 
who take issue with this metaphor as perhaps too strongly stated, a 
brief content analysis of the literature on practice research is recom-
mended. 7 2 
I suggest that the marketing of (and hard-sell approaches to) social 
work technology will become less necessary the more researchers respect 
the actual processes by which the practitioner comes to know-in-practice. 
The desired end product of this mutuality will be a more productive 
research enterprise and a practice arena that contributes more sub-
stantially to informing its own conceptual bases. 
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